

Jung, Myth, and Biography

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‘But then what is your myth – the myth in which you do live?’
Jung, 1963, p. 195

‘[T]he self, which is man’s totality, consisting on the one hand of that which is conscious to him, and on the other hand of the contents of the unconscious’

Jung, 1952, par. 755

INTRODUCTION

Memories, Dreams, Reflections (Jung, 1963), published posthumously, and *Answer to Job* (Jung, 1952), a late work, are both writings devoted to Jung’s idea of the self. Like other themes that Jung returned to time and time again in his long career, the self is both conceptual and narrative; it is frequently subject to the kind of summary in the above quotation from *Answer to Job* (hereafter referred to as *Job*), and somehow mysteriously escapes definition into ever more enigmatic narratives. Conceptually, the self refers both to the totality of the psyche, conscious and unconscious, and to the most powerful centring archetype of the collective unconscious, the goal of individuation. In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (hereafter referred to as *Memories*), and *Job*, two specific literary forms are used, not just to describe but also to stage and enact the Jungian self: these are myth and biography. *Memories* reads as an autobiography yet builds its narrative upon notions of a ‘personal myth’. *Job* is a biography of the Judaeo-Christian God, or, a reading of sacred scriptures in the language of Jung’s own ‘myth’.

At first glance, myth and biography would seem to be unlikely allies

in self-representation, Jungian or otherwise. Whereas biography and autobiography focuses upon the individual, seeking out historical particularity in the lived life, myth is essentially a collective and cultural story. Myths provide for culture narratives that are not limited to historical events. They connect the human world to the non-human, to nature and/or the divine. Yet, as my previous study of *Memories* showed, that text develops a key term, 'personal myth', to describe, first of all, Jung's sense of an inherent shape to his own most intimate experiences (Rowland, 2002). Secondly, 'personal myth' acts as a bridging term from the 'personal' to the conceptual. It comes to signify his psychological ideas and therefore becomes a means of representing his inner life and his work as united. 'Personal myth' becomes analytical psychology in a confession of a crucial weighting on the theories as a *life's* work.

I also suggested that Jung's writings are characterised by an entwined dual impulse in which an acknowledgement of the roots of his ideas in his individual experience (personal myth) works with and against a drive to universalise and construct a comprehensive psychological scheme. This mode of writing I termed 'grand theory' – it makes large claims for the ability to account for psyche and culture. Personal myth mutates sinuously into grand theory where the sense of the provisional and subjective intrinsic to the 'personal' becomes lost in the pursuit of broad cultural criticisms. An example of these two tendencies would be my point earlier about Jungian ideas such as the self existing both as concepts subject to dictionary definitions (constituents of grand theory) and simultaneously as never completed narratives (the subjective apprehensions of personal myth).

Therefore, I propose in this reading of *Memories* and *Job* to explore how myth, personal or otherwise, becomes so implicated in texts with a strong biographical element. What is the nature and status of this 'personal' myth? What, precisely, are the literary means of connecting myth and biography? And finally, what then are the implications for Jung's representation of the self? I shall be drawing upon recent work on autobiography, biography, and myth, in particular Laura Marcus's excellent study, *Auto/biographical Discourses* (Marcus, 1994) and Lawrence Coupe's invaluable *Myth* (Coupe, 1997).

As well as sharing the use of myth and biography, both *Memories* and *Job* are experimental readings of modernity. By staging the issues germane to writing on the self, these works offer themselves as healing

narratives for the alienated modern psyche. Indeed, I will suggest that the texts provide a sequence, that *Memories* works peculiarly as a sequel to *Job* in a myth that is at the same time personal, cultural, postmodern and cosmic. This is despite the fact that *Memories* is a highly complex and conflicted text.

THE PROBLEM OF *MEMORIES*, *DREAMS*, *REFLECTIONS*

Memories is an account of Jung's life written in the first person. It has been variously described as an autobiography and a biography. In a powerful essay, 'Memories, dreams, omissions', Sonu Shamdasani argues that *Memories* is 'by no means' Jung's autobiography (Shamdasani, 1999, p. 33). In revealing the extent of editing, rewriting and censorship, Shamdasani's demonstrates that the complex evolution of *Memories* makes the published English text contingent. Consequently, if *Memories* is read as an authorised autobiography, there is a grave risk of distorting Jung's legacy.

I would like to suggest two possible reactions to the problem of authorship in *Memories*. One reaction is practical and methodological. *Memories* refers repeatedly to *Job*, a work whose authorship is undisputed. If the myth of *Memories* and the myth of *Job* offer intertextual correspondences then the relationship between these two works should continue to be fruitful. It does not suggest or 'prove' that the essentials of *Memories* come undiluted from the mind of Jung. In matters of the psyche, Jung was concerned to play down straightforward causality in favour of forward-driving teleology. In reading *Memories* with *Job*, I wish to play down any suppositions about what it 'proves' about the origin of *Memories* in favour of what it indicates and myth and selfhood for the Jungian canon. My method, like Jung's, will be to displace causality in order to privilege meaning.

Such an attitude brings me to my second reaction to the problem of authorship in *Memories*: what is at stake in a work when the author is disputed? Clearly, by cultural consensus the author is the guarantor of the meaning of the work. In a text such as *Job*, securely located with *The Collected Works*, we have the comfort of asking 'what did Jung really mean by X?' when puzzled by a particular passage. In effect, authorial intention becomes the principle by which the reader interprets the work. What did Jung really mean by describing God as a symbol of the self? What are the author's intentions behind the portrayal of Sophia as the feminine element in the godhead?

Reading for authorial intention is so culturally pervasive that it has become 'natural'. It is barely noticed that such a theory of reading is explicitly hierarchical. The principle of authorial intention is a principle of authority. The author represents the ultimate authority to which all textual disputes must be referred. What Jung really means by this is . . . Ultimately this is a theological model with the author as the god of the text; the only source, the sponsor, the controller of all meaning.

What I find most intriguing in the whole project of switching a reading of *Memories* and *Job* away from an emphasis on origins to one of resonance, purpose and correspondence, is the way that it mimics Jung's own suspicion of mechanistic causality and his preference for symbolic amplification. Jung did not ignore causality; he chose to de-emphasise it. Similarly, I will be still be using a rhetoric of authorial intention while stressing the vital connections that these texts infer between myth, biographical writing, and reading. Within such literary structures are to be found the potent mysteries of Jung's self.

LITERARY FORMS OF AUTO/BIOGRAPHY AND SELFHOOD

In Laura Marcus's history of auto/biography, she elegantly describes a literary genre at the heart of debates about modernity, the self, history, and representation (Marcus, 1994). If the post-Enlightenment era is dominated by reason and scientific objectivity, then autobiography in particular, promised to heal the split between the self and the world. At its very core, autobiography contains a recurrent tension about the status of language. Can language connect consciousness to the world beyond the inner life? Does auto/biographical 'truth' lie in a positivist notion of correspondence in which language truly reflects physical events 'in the world'? Alternatively, is an idealist conception of language more correct in which the only truth of auto/biography is to be found in its internal textual coherence. An auto/biography is 'true' insofar as it provides a coherent story, an aesthetic wholeness enacted in the writing. The construction of an aesthetic object takes precedence over fidelity to the historical events of a life.

The division within auto/biography, between faithful representation of the events of a life and a faithful construction of coherence and wholeness within the writing, is variously staged as a tension between history and literature, between science and literature, and between history and myth. Broadly, are biography and autobiography essentially

literary forms for which the facts of a life are of secondary importance to the creation of an aesthetically pleasing narrative? Or, can the focus on the unique position of the autobiographer, as both author and subject, offer substance to those collective forms of knowledge (history and science) that rely upon a correspondence between words and things?

Deconstruction, on the other hand, argues that the slippery nature of language reveals that the self is a continual contingent performance. It does not exist outside and prior to language. There is no 'outside' of language because meaning and significance are always caught up in a process; a system of relations that is language itself. Words do not stick to their significances; they disseminate rather than secure meaning and so there is no secure system by which words can correspond to the world, or, even, correspond to each other.

In such a worldview, writing an auto/biography is an endless exercise in revealing the illusions of presence. Meaning is not 'present' in words and so there is no present self in the writing of autobiography, nor true self 'out there' in the biographical subject. If such a true self did exist (transcendent of the system of language that creates slippery significance – not meaning), then it would be beyond the powers of language to represent it. As it is, in denying truth in language and refuting being outside it, deconstruction proclaims the death of the subject.

There is, as Marcus argues, a fascinating sense that auto/biography has anticipated deconstruction's preoccupation with death (Marcus, 1994, pp. 208–10). If, on the one hand, deconstruction appears to demolish auto/biography by removing both subject and generic existence, then autobiography at least has always contained the generic standpoint of death as that which makes its existence impossible. It is a paradox that no autobiography is complete until the subject has died. Few autobiographies have ever been completed post-mortem.

Given such a starting point, it could be argued that autobiography enacts the death of its subject in the act of writing. Death is the only guarantee of completeness, of wholeness, and *therefore* of the truth of internal coherence *and* of historical importance. Unsurprisingly, there is a long tradition of auto/biographical metaphors of anatomical dissection of the self or of the work as a monument, a tomb or act of memorial. What for deconstruction is a perpetual undoing of meaning, is for auto/biography a kind of ontological ground upon which the edifice of the text can be built. Death is the absence necessary for the presence (of meaning and truth) in auto/biography.

Lawrence Coupe's invaluable study of myth also describes a recurrent dual impulse within the form (Coupe, 1997). From the time of the ancient Greeks, *mythos*, or story, has tended to be bracketed off from *logos*, or forms of truth including science or history. However, the division between *mythos* and *logos* is never as absolute as different ages like to pretend. Aristotle was the first to perceive that certain kinds of knowledge are intrinsically narrative. For him, *mythos* meant the plot, the story, and it structured history as much as the religious stories of his culture (Coupe, 1997, p. 38).

Modernity, according to Coupe, relies upon a paradoxical post-Enlightenment myth of mythlessness; the idea that humanity has outgrown its need for shaping stories and can now live in the pure forms of empirical science and reason (Coupe, 1997, p. 13). This works as long as the theoretical underpinnings of science and reason are not themselves subject to mythical scrutiny. Postmodern critics have pointed out that modernity's mythlessness is essentially narrative: grand narratives of the progress of science and of human emancipation are its necessary 'foundations'. Consequently, it is correct to speak of a myth of mythlessness rather than just an absence of myth. Such an idea relies upon an Aristotelian sense of myth-in-history – a shaping narrative within history that makes it intelligible. History and myth are not, in this sense, opposed.

Of course, the perception of *logos* as depending upon a backbone of *mythos* does not eliminate the differences between the idea of truth as separable from narrative (*logos*) and the notion of narrative as fundamental (*myth*).

As a contrast, radical typology is Coupe's term for the possibility of amplifying myth into ever new narratives (Coupe, 1997, pp. 108–10). Typology was the medieval method of reading the Old Testament of the *Bible* as a foreshadowing of the new. Adam becomes an early 'type' of Christ and so on. In effect, typology is another form of allegory, since all narrative motifs lead to the highest truth of Christianity. Coupe coins 'radical typology' as the recreation of myth without foundational pretensions. Myth unites with history in an endless recapitulation of narratives without closure. Although this corresponds to the condition of myths in postmodernism, it is not exclusively and contemporary phenomena. Radical typology is also contained in the shamanistic view

of myth as the intersection of sacred and profane time that can never be stabilised or reduced to a dogma. It is myth-in-history as not divisible from it; the practice of mystical writers such as Blake.

Indeed, radical typology is a form that includes a sense of the 'other' in its endless denial of closure and exclusion. It is, therefore, potentially an ethical form of writing since acknowledging the other forever beyond its horizons is the unappeasable drive of its never satiated creativity. Radical typology becomes writing that spans modernity's rational/irrational divide (Coupe, 1997, pp. 196–7).

MEMORIES, DREAMS, REFLECTIONS

At a brief glance, *Memories* appears to obey the conventional expectation of auto/biography – that it will tell a life story in a linear sequence from earliest memories until close to the end. However, what we have in the existing English edition is an auto/biographical account in which chronology gives way to thematic organisation. Even just by looking at the contingent chapter arrangements, it is possible to perceive an ambivalence in the work between life history in *linear* time and the desire to shape that history in order to construct an *argument*. Is *Memories* primarily the individual history of Jung (whether written by him or by others), or, is it an argument for his unique psychological perceptions? Of course, it is both and the text generates the term 'personal myth' as a king pivot or transforming catalyst from one form of writing to another. The key transition is that from a linear model of an authentic life story to a myth primarily represented in non-linear terms. In fact, there are at least eight key methods where the circularity that Shamdasani says was lost by the editing of *Memories*, can still be traced in the work. The methods are: thematic organisation, repetition and substitution, metaphor, spatiality, ritual, monumentality, reading, and myth. I am going to show how these methods operate before exploring the implications of linear chronology and non-linear literary forms. To what extent is *Memories's* personal myth non-linear history and what does this imply for the portrayal of the Jungian self?

The thematic organisation of *Memories* is, I would contend, the overarching structure by which more submerged non-chronological literary devices surface and disrupt linearity within the auto/biography. Repetition and substitution is far more intrinsic to the substance of the work's 'I'. For example, the use of dreams to both interrupt and

contribute to the flow of outer events is itself a formal repetition of a narrative device in which linear time and logical causality are suspended.

Repetition becomes the basis of a mode of interpretation. Repeated dreams citing circular motifs are read as the tendency for the psyche to produce centring signs. *Memories* reads dreams *allegorically* in two ways. Repeated images in dream narratives are the foundations for Jung's psychological ideas, such as circular mandala representations indicating the structural principles of the self. Secondly, and contrary to Jung's explicit statements about treating dreams as meaningful in themselves and not reducing them to the (ego) preoccupations of the dreamer as either personal, causal or historical, *Memories* frequently uses dreams to advance the linear sequential narrative. A dream may enable Jung to know what to do next, as in the decision to study medicine, or in how to treat a patient; or, it may reveal some attitude that needs discarding, such as the vision of killing Siegfried, or it may be diagnosed as contributing to the personal myth (Jung, 1963, pp. 204–5). For example, the dream of Liverpool is beautiful resonant story. It is narratively embedded by being interpreted as a revelation within the personal myth that unites Jung's life with Jung's psychology. Or, Jung's 'psychology' – his own psychic disposition, is the ground of his 'psychology' – as a system of ideas. Personal myth stands for a mythical structure to the life story and that same mythical structure is a shaping of the psychology: 'through this dream I understood that the self is the principle and archetype of orientation and meaning' (Jung, 1963, p. 224).

Substitution is another form of repetition in which structurally similar elements take each other's place in ways that disrupt their historical particularity. Most noticeable to me is the way that *Memories* is full of substitute parents. Given the wide disparity in ages, it is easy to sympathise with the notion that Sigmund Freud acted as a father figure to the much younger man. Not content with the logical relation, *Memories* rather astoundingly suggests that positions of father and son are *substitutable* between Freud and Jung. Freud is said to have interpreted Jung's dream as a fantasy of father murder against him. However, when Jung picks up the fainting elder man he exclaims that 'he looked at me as if I were his father' (Jung, 1963, p. 180).

Memories is concerned to frustrate the obvious paternal metaphor in that Freud was so much the senior man (in both senses). Jung's refusal to

stabilise the paternal metaphor with regard to Freud is itself a repetition of his refusal to respect the (religious) authority of his actual father, Paul Jung. Both paternal figures are portrayed as misreading a jealous god: Paul Jung loses sight of him strangled by conventional Christianity; Freud's Jehovah is disguised as his sexual theory in another of *Memories's* resonant substitutions (Jung, 1963, p. 192).

The persistence of repetition and substitution within *Memories* is a prime ingredient of its predilection for metaphor. Not only people and images, but also uncanny events, and 'things' like stones, all work metaphorically across the text. Metaphor entails the substitution of one element for another. It presupposes an accretion of meaning from the repetition-with-a-difference that is metaphoric substitution. Metaphor associates elements that are not linked causally. As a device it perceives likenesses, not answers. For example, at university Jung describes a fellow student as a 'lone wolf' with a 'monomaniacal ambition' who later became a schizophrenic (Jung, 1963, p. 131). Here, Jung discerns not his double but his parallel. He links the fate of the young man with his own first book on the subject. The narrative offers a metaphoric substitution stressing likeness *and* difference. The young man is not Jung and does not function as some sort of answer to Jung's identity at that moment. Rather, the young man represents a narrative possibility for Jung, one of a potentially endless sequence of possible positions, a sequence without closure.

The devotion of a chapter to travel indicates the importance of space as a topic to the narrative of *Memories*. Spatiality is both the inner space of the creative psyche and the 'outer' space of travels over the earth's surface. When Jung argues that, 'the unconscious corresponds to the mythic land of the dead, the land of the ancestors' (Jung, 1963, p. 216), he is transforming both psyche and time into space. *Memories's* dreams and visions are essentially spatial. The inner world is an inner *landscape* of nature and cities, castles and even space travel above the planet. To journey into the psyche is to wander in space and time beyond the usual boundaries, since a crusader knight may haunt a modern city or a dead father be visited in his new abode (Jung, 1963, pp. 239–41).

Like spatiality, ritual and monumentality are also narrative means of shifting from linear chronology. Unsurprisingly, the stress on ritual is both about repetition, in that rituals are repeated actions that invoke the sacred and rituals recur repeatedly throughout *Memories*. The little boy who makes a mannikin and hides it in a box with *his* stone is also the

older boy who builds a model village and the troubled psychiatrist who finds comfort in constructing a miniature town. Later still, of course, the ritual element of building is materially enacted in the creation of the Bollingen Tower.

Reading and myth remain the literary means by which *Memories* frustrates a causal linear narrative in the service of representing Jung's psyche and self (in all senses). The most 'read' text and the source of most of the cited myth is the *Bible*. Within *Memories* the *Bible* provides the form of mythological structuring described by Lawrence Coupe as radical typology.

RADICAL TYPOLOGY IN *MEMORIES*

'Personal' myth is the declared core of *Memories*, signifying the mysterious mutation of a life story into a religious testament and a psychology. One key aspect of the personal myth is the drive to allegory, in which dreams, psychic experiences and events are read for logos, for an abstractable *theory* or universal meaning. An example of this would be when the dream of Liverpool yields something that sounds like a dictionary definition of Jung's self (Jung, 1963, p. 224) or the visionary figure Philemon is said to 'teach' the objectivity of the psyche (Jung, 1963, p. 208).

However, allegory is not all. Radical typology inheres in all the narrative methods discussed so far: in repetition and substitution; in the limitlessness of Jungian metaphor; in the intersection of sacred and profane in ritual and monument (in which action in time is necessary to evoke a reality beyond time). All these devices deny closure. They open the 'personal' into the mythic by their sense of the other and endlessly unknowably, un-capturable in writing. Yet the most overt way in which radical typology structures *Memories* is in the frequent rereadings of the *Bible* for myths, for story.

From the boy nicknamed 'Father Abraham' at school, to the likening of the need to renounce his unfathomable No.2 personality to Adam leaving Eden, to his pre-World War 1 dream of feeding a crowd with grapes, like Christ, the *Bible* offers a narrative model. Just as Jung reads his own life as biblical, so his personal myth fuses around typological readings of the *Bible*: a vision of a greenish-gold Christ confirms the importance of alchemy, Christ and Buddha are both embodiments of the self in entirely different cultural contexts.

It is important to understand the radical nature of this use of the *Bible*. Jung is not proclaiming himself as a new Christ, Aryan or otherwise. The personal myth is *personal* in that it does not claim to be a transcendent revelation fit for all peoples and all times: 'I can only . . . "tell stories"' (Jung, 1963, p. 17). It is also 'personal' because it is a structuring of personal experience of the unconscious in defiance of the most immediate cultural model of his father's Protestant Christianity.

To recap, I am arguing that Jung composes his personal myth principally using the narrative method that Coupe defines as radical typology. It is a form that resists closure and makes no claim for universal transcendent significance. Its recapitulation of other mythical stories is potentially limitless: radical typology is *radical* in the notion of rewriting narratives without boundaries so never producing an 'other' to be scapegoated. Of course, as I have shown, the tendency to allegory, to abstract a logos or singular 'truth' from the personal myth does haunt *Memories*. The whole auto/biography is punctuated by interruptions to the personal myth consisting of definitive statements about the psyche, the nature of dreams and the self. Narratively, the tension between radical typology and allegory (or personal myth and grand theory) rests upon the ambivalence between non-linear and linear elements in the writing.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF NON-LINEAR WRITING FOR *MEMORIES*

Memories is a profoundly anti-linear work in its use of thematic structuring, repetition and substitution, spatiality, ritual and monumentality, reading and myth as radical typological methods of describing the personal myth. Its anti-linear preferences have three major related consequences: *Memories* is against linearity as time, against linearity as causality and as conceptual language.

The auto/biography devotes considerable energy to frustrating a notion of linear time as a succession of present moments that determine a life from birth to death. Three ways of presenting time, as family life, as history and as ending in death, are all, through radical typology, shown as participating in time as recurrence or eternity. In fact, the depiction of time as non-linear is one of the main means of representing the unconscious as the mythical land of the dead, including parents, the abode of ancestral spirits, as history reconfigured as spatial.

A consequence of challenging the axiomatic assumption of time as linear sequence is that causality, in the sense of one action producing

another, is similarly questioned. If family life can function as a series of substitutions so that son, Carl, spends much of his textual contact with his father, Paul, acting as the father's mentor – a substitution even more explicit when Freud is said to gaze at Jung as a father figure – then the sense of historical and locatable causes motivating the psyche is diminished. The Oedipus complex gives way to Jung's stress on meaningful non-causal coincidence in the psyche and its interactions with the world.

Conceptual language is linear because it relies upon words fitting together in a sequence within a sentence. It also implies causality in which one concept infers or produces another. Concepts are the language of science where 'science' signifies notions of a consistent verifiable truth that is abstractable from the context in which it first appeared. For conceptual language is not contextual, either in the text where it is expressed, nor is it a precept *local* to the culture that produced it. It derives from Enlightenment notions of reason as transcendent of cultural variations and split off from the irrational side of the mind.

Memories is explicit about the function of personal myth in putting mythos back into logos, or creating a science that is mythological. Not only are myths the earliest forms of science (Jung, 1963, p. 335) but today they still *are* science as 'the natural and indispensable stage between unconscious and conscious cognition' (Jung, 1963, p. 343). For Jung, myth is a mode of science, perhaps a kind of scientific 'mood'.

What is fascinating here is that *Memories* is both pre-modern and postmodern on language, science, and myth. In wanting to reconnect science and myth, Jung evokes a pre-Enlightenment world before the splitting off of reason and its conceptual thinking. It is also a desire to reconnect language and psyche in the notion that representation and cognition unite in personal myth. However, Jung develops an almost postmodern scepticism about language and science by stressing the resistances of the unconscious to Enlightenment thinking. Language and science have to be invested with myth, not allegorically, but as the renunciation of rational foundations. Such pre-modern/postmodern articulation is the keystone of *Memories* portrayal of the self.

MEMORIES, DREAMS, REFLECTIONS AS WRITING ABOUT THE SELF

Memories fuses what Marcus sees as paradoxically distinct: death in genre and death in writing. What Marcus calls the self (that she sees as

bounded, *limited* by death), *Memories* portrays as personal myth, writing without origin or closure, because any posited origin or closure dwells in an unconscious whose meanings can never be captured in the linear language of rationality. The genre with its standpoint of death is transformed into the personal myth with its endless diffusion of self that is cited/sited far beyond the ego. True, the auto/biography unravels what Marcus calls self or identity. Death in genre and death (of the subject) in writing are the desired consequences of the personal myth: the ego-self of conventional language gives way to the Jungian self. And the Jungian self has as its being and literary form the personal myth that hinges on the standpoint of death and the dilution of stable self knowledge in stable language.

The mythical language of the unconscious and of radical typology posits nothing; it refers to mythical narratives without foreclosing any meaning. The death of the author as the death of the subject of writing (a literal and metaphorical death), and as the death of authority finds a startlingly original form in the personal myth of *Memories*.

The mysterious heart of the personal myth is the Jungian self: 'there is no linear evolution; there is only a circumambulation of the self' (Jung, 1963, p. 222).

Taking the vantage point of death as one of the anti-linear narrative possibilities is a way of writing beyond the ending. Diversions into conceptual language are profoundly inauthentic methods of representing the Jungian self. This examination of *Memories* shows what is at stake in defining the self as both centre and totality; as archetype, goal of psychic evolution and the widening prairies of psychic possibility. For the self is *represented* here through radical typology and *is* radical typology in the personal myth's limitless spinning of tales.

ANSWER TO JOB

Common to both *Memories* and *Job* is an ultimate downplaying of linear sequence in biographical writing in favour of an emphasis on the spatial. Consequently 'ego' and 'unconscious' are conceived as *positions* as much as processes. If *Memories* takes the 'position' of the ego as the threshold for writing (as a way of 'seeing' or speculating), then *Job* tries to compose the position of the other; the perspective of the unconscious.

On the other hand, and paradoxically, *Job* is in the first instance more

interested in linear narrative because it is more preoccupied with the interrelationships between culture, history, and psyche.

Job retells the story of God in both books of the *Bible* as if he were an individuating being. Such a project has a more immediate linear narrative drive in two ways. In the first place, *Job* offers a fairly sequential reading of the Old and New Testaments, in part because the text is interested in individuation as a process in linear time. Secondly, historical sequence produces both evidence for, and is superseded by, a causal and conceptual argument. God begins as Yahweh. He is a savage being who torments Job, essentially because he is jealous of the greater consciousness of his creation. The problem is one of individuation; God has a dark side variously incarnated in Satan and in the terrifying possibilities for mass death produced by twentieth-century man. God both needs to individuate (for which man has a part to play) and *is* man's unconscious, the site for human striving after the self. The personal myth is present in *Job* as the narrative of individuation. It is also to be found in the writing of the strange and passionate story.

THE BIOGRAPHY OF GOD

Answer to Job closely analyses selected biblical verses and draws some startling conclusions. God's jealous doubting of Job's faithfulness is personified as his elder, nastier son, Satan (Jung, 1952, par. 579–85). Fear of betrayal by Job is, of course, an imperfect reflection of the tendency to unfaithfulness in Yahweh himself; a tendency confirmed when we later learn of his two wives. Sophia or wisdom has existed with/in Yahweh for eternity, only to be supplanted by the more legitimate bride, Israel. Job is brutally treated by Yahweh. Deprived of family and wealth, his protesting incomprehension of the irrationality of God goes unanswered for millennia. However, his greater insight than his creator 'raises' him in the moral stakes. God's unconsciousness remains a festering sore within divine-human relations.

The Old Testament prophet Ezekiel provides a second narrative climax. His perceptions of God's nature produce the title 'son of man', an indication of greater transformations to come. For it is Christ who supplies the true 'answer to Job'. Son of God as aspect of God, Christ's incarnation into the sufferings of human beings culminates in his despairing cry upon the cross. An answer to Job rings out across the centuries (Jung, 1952, par. 647).

Unfortunately, such a neatly mirroring recompense does not end the problems of divine unconsciousness. The principal drive behind this continuity of God as a 'problem' for man is, I would argue, that narrative closure is anathema to Jung's writing of the self. The Book of Revelation, Jung concludes paradoxically, is likely to have been composed by the Gospel author, John, because it sounds so unlike him. Revelation's explosive apocalyptic and overtly pagan fire is the all too predictable compensation for the Gospel's tale of certainty and love (Jung, 1952, par. 698). John's revelation is his 'personal' individuation myth, but it has a cultural dimension in the 'woman clothed with the sun' (Jung, 1952, par. 711). She is the return of the feminine too often excluded from the Christian account of the divine.

Job reads Revelation and the whole *Bible* as a myth-in-history. The personal myth is *vitally* shaped by cultural experiences and exclusions. By exploring a cultural dimension to Revelation, Jung projects John's personal myth forwards into the history of division within Christian churches and the hostility between communism and capitalism in the twentieth century. In an exemplary allegorical reading, religious and political splits are 'both expressions of the unrecognised polarity of the dominant archetype' (Jung, 1952, par. 660). Individuation's personal myth acquires a cultural charge and condenses into grand theory.

However the myth-in-history does resist foreclosure into an abstract theory in that it becomes a shaping force in the personal myth of contemporary history. John's warnings of apocalypse are not a distant echo, nor are they even a foreshadowing. The myth-in-history combines chronological time and the perpetual immediacy of everybody's unconscious here and now. John's fears of apocalypse in *his* culture are also of apocalypse now:

the four sinister horsemen, the threatening tumult of trumpets, and the brimming vials of wrath are still waiting; already the atom bomb hangs over us like the sword of Damocles, and behind that lurk the incomparably more terrible possibilities of chemical warfare . . . (Jung, 1952, par. 733)

The myth cannot end. What is now urgently required is a new incarnation: man must explicitly take on the terrible polarities of God within his unconscious. The personal myth needs to become a myth of deliverance. Simultaneously, the narrative constitutes a personal myth for its author and intended reader.

Job and *Memories* offer auto/biography in two senses: these are the

historical and the mythical. The historical mode consists of events in linear time and culture, while the mythical is the essentially non-linear circumambulations of the self. What is not sufficiently recognised is that these two forms of auto/biography are not separable. Heavy editing of *Memories*, in particular the omissions of historical figures, have de-emphasised Jung's involvement in his own culture. It could be argued that he makes a similar move himself in *Job* by regarding the scarcity of biographical details of both Yahweh and Christ as a bonus to his myth-making. However, the point is not that Jung is uninterested in history or culture, or finds it of secondary importance to individuation. Rather, history and culture are themselves caught up with unconscious processes and so is the means of representing them. The ego-self in chronological time is inseparable from the Jungian self, in which history condenses into spatiality.

Memories and *Job* are both stories of the self from different positions. *Memories* narrates from the position of the ego-self and becomes gradually more and more immersed in the anti-linear spatiality of the Jungian self. *Job* starts from the position of the other and works towards a projected union with the ego-self in its (personal) myth prophecy of the new incarnation in man. On the one hand, *Memories* and *Job* are auto/biographies of the inseparable ego-self and Jungian self from different *positions*; the two texts have a spatial relationship. On the other hand, they exist in a linear *consequential* relation since *Memories* functions as a *sequel* to the vast cultural and historical expanses of *Job*. After all, the best description of the coming incarnation of God in man, the projected *future* of the *Job* myth, is *Memories* itself.

MEMORIES, DREAMS, REFLECTIONS AS A SEQUEL TO ANSWER TO JOB

The well known dichotomy in Jung's description of the self (as 'totality' of conscious and unconscious and as archetype within the unconscious, Jung, 1952, pars. 755 and 757), is directly connected to his two forms of auto/biographical writing. These two forms of writing are not allegory and radical typology, because even the ego-self needs to be open to the other. Rather, Jung's two forms of autobiographical writing are that of the ego-self in historical time and the Jungian self as spatiality or, chronology versus positionality.

Memories and *Job* reveal the coincidence of the two modes of the self in Jung's writing as codependence. Without evocation of the Jungian

self, the ego-self is inauthentic. Without the linguistic resources of the ego in language and narrative, the Jungian self could not be represented at all. These works are linked spatially and sequentially; the two perspectives on the self, and by *Memories* being a chronological as well as logical extension of the *Job* myth.

Answer to Job uses mythical radical typology to pivot a myth of deliverance against a myth of apocalypse. 'Everything now depends on man' (Jung, 1952, par. 745), so it is in the projected and unlimitable future that the possibility of the myth of deliverance may be incarnated in modern man. In fact, with both psychic processes and means of representation, individuation is presented here as the potential radical conversion of apocalypse into deliverance and *vice versa*. A possibility that I can only touch on here is that the *act of reading Job* may be part of that act of transformation and openness to the other in the mind of the reader. Reading is a further body-mind incarnation of the myth.

As a sequel, *Memories* takes the apocalypse/deliverance myth of *Job* and recasts it in a creation myth: the myth of (self) creation. For Jung, a myth of self creation is creation by the self; yet it is not the transcendent, potentially knowable core identity of the humanists. One pole of what Jung means by creation by the self is the apparently pre-modern creation by God, provided that God is regarded as always at home in the human psyche. Additionally, such an anti-modern notion of the self can also be expressed as the active unconscious embracing cultural discourses to shape and ego that itself approximates to cultural theory's version of selfhood. And this unconscious is unknowable. The key of this union of the pre- and postmodern is to be found, in myth, as both psyche and means of representing the mysteries of the unconscious. Myth is Jung's writing of self as long as myth is a radical typological openness to endless storytelling. Once allegorical impulses to abstract from mythos into universal principles occur, then the writing moves into grand theory; its language divorced from the unconscious and the self.

Jung's creation myth is myth in the creation of self. Radical typology provides a form of writing that *is* the creation of self as well as representing it. Myth depicts the self as historical and cultural simultaneously with the self of sacred non-linear time for which metaphor and actuality is spatiality. Therefore, myth in the creation of self is also self creation in myth. The personal myth of an individual existence is part of the culturally located myth-in-history and inheres

within a cosmological religious myth. Reading *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* as a sequel/companion to *Answer to Job* makes it more explicit that the works are structuring a myth of man's self-fashioning in the cosmos; a myth that does not bypass history and culture. These works provide literary genres of self-representation that are also acts of self-making.

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