This book encapsulates John Beebe’s influential work on the analytical psychology of consciousness. Building on C. G. Jung’s theory of psychological types and on subsequent clarifications by Marie-Louise von Franz and Isabel Briggs Myers, Beebe demonstrates the bond between the eight types of consciousness Jung named and the archetypal complexes that impart energy and purpose to our emotions, fantasies, and dreams. For this collection, Beebe has revised and updated his most influential and significant previously published papers and has introduced, in a brand new chapter, a surprising theory of type and culture.

Beebe’s model enables readers to take what they already know about psychological types and apply it to depth psychology. The insights contained in the fifteen chapters of this book will be especially valuable for Jungian psychotherapists, post-Jungian academics and scholars, psychological type practitioners, and type enthusiasts.

John Beebe is a Jungian analyst in private practice in San Francisco. A former president of the C. G. Jung Institute of San Francisco, he is a prolific author and editor and has spoken on analytical psychology all over the world.
ENERGIES AND PATTERNS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE

The reservoir of consciousness

John Beebe
For Adam Frey
# CONTENTS

*List of illustrations*  ix  
*Preface*  xi  
*Acknowledgments*  xiii  
*Permissions*  xv  
*Collected works of C. G. Jung*  xvii  

## PART I

**Theoretical contributions**  1

1 The eight function-attitudes unpacked  3  
2 Once more with feeling  8  
3 Understanding consciousness through the theory of psychological types  19  
4 Archetypal aspects of masculine adaptation  51  
5 *The Wizard of Oz*: a vision of development in the American political psyche  74  
6 The stretch of individual typologies in the formation of cultural attitudes  97
PART II
Type and the MBTI 115

7 Evolving the eight-function model 117
8 Type and archetype: the spine and its shadow 126
9 Type and archetype: the arms and their shadow 134

PART III
History of type 143

10 Psychological types: an historical overview 145
11 The Red Book as a work of conscience 167
12 Psychological types in Freud and Jung 181

PART IV
Applications of type 195

13 Difficulties in the recognition of psychological type 197
14 An archetypal model of the self in dialogue 209
15 Identifying the American shadow: typological reflections on the 1992 Los Angeles riots 221

Name index 225
Subject index 228
ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

3.1 Jung’s hierarchy of the types of consciousness in an individual 27
3.2 My mostly conscious orientation 33
3.3 My orientation with archetypal complexes 38
3.4 Configurations of consciousness corresponding to the 16 MBTI types 39
3.5 Orientation of my shadow 40
3.6 Orientation of my shadow with archetypal complexes 41
3.7 Archetypes and the areas of personality they pattern 44
3.8 Archetypal complexes carrying the eight functions 45
5.1 The relationship between Dorothy and the Scarecrow 79
5.2 The political relationship between Dorothy and the Scarecrow (1) 79
5.3 The political relationship between Dorothy and the Scarecrow (2) 80
5.4 An auxiliary character axis 81
5.5 The pattern of consciousness emanating from the story 81
5.6 Consciousnesses and their political designations 81
Illustrations

5.7 Dorothy and the Scarecrow in relation to their antagonists 84
5.8 The interplay of auxiliary consciousnesses 86
5.9 Stations in Dorothy’s political development 90
5.10 Archetypal complexes carrying the eight functions of consciousness as seen in *The Wizard of Oz* 92

7.1 Archetypal complexes carrying the eight functions of consciousness 122
7.2 Archetypes associated with the eight functions of consciousness (using ENFJ as an example) 123

8.1 Archetypes associated with the first four function-attitudes (using ENTP as an example) 127
8.2 The ‘spine’ of personality and its shadow (for an introverted feeling man) 131

9.1 Archetypes associated with the first four functions (using ENTP as an example) 136
9.2 The ENTP’s arms and their shadow 137

10.1 An illustration of the archetypal complexes carrying the eight functions of consciousness (using ESTJ as an example) 157

Tables

7.1 MBTI types showing pairing of archetypal roles and types of awareness 123
8.1 The superior and inferior functions and their associated archetypes 129
9.1 Types of auxiliary function and tertiary function and their shadows 139
The psychologically minded analyst, therapist, or counselor soon discovers an interesting paradox: although people’s unconscious habits are readily visible, the consciousness of others remains strangely opaque. As my colleague Donald Kalsched has observed in *The Inner World of Trauma*, “The self-same powers that seem so set on undermining our efforts … are the very reservoir from which new life, fuller integration, and true enlightenment derive” (p. 62). To believe that the psyche contains the seeds of its own healing is quintessentially Jungian.

This book brings together many strands of analytical, archetypal, and self psychology, including the complex theory over which Freud and Jung sparred; the archetypal psychology that James Hillman developed from Jung’s later work; Kohut’s image of a depth psychology centered in a ‘little-s’ self continually affected by the empathy, integrity, and the personal struggles of others; the defenses of the self as inspected by Michael Fordham; and the Jungian ego-Self axis as conceptualized by Neumann and Edinger. But it is the type theory that Jung brought to maturity in 1921 that I have drawn upon most to answer for myself which self-experiences these teachers are actually talking about.

What is new here is the degree to which our typology both creates and helps us to discover the self and its defenses in a personal way. It is thus a contribution to the understanding of the person in the psyche. That person is urged into being by archetypes, including the transpersonal Self that seems to drive human individuation; but the ‘little-s’ self we experience as persons has its own forms of consciousness, nested in the care of archetypes but capable of asserting and integrating themselves independently. I say this lest anyone reading what I have written about the archetypes in this book take the eight-function, eight-archetype model as an unaltering image of inevitable rigidity. Rather, it is the psyche’s many dynamic parts that give it the flexibility, over time, to articulate the Self in a personal way that our adaptation to our typology makes us capable of displaying.
The reader is therefore advised to approach the book with this developmental perspective in mind. It may not be amiss, as I celebrate in these pages a full fifty years of reflecting on Jungian typology, to admit what by now must be obvious: that my own perspective on the subject is continuing to develop.

John Beebe
San Francisco, October 2015
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Reference is made in this book to the following volumes of the Collected Works of C. G. Jung using the abbreviated form Cw followed by the volume number. The Collected Works is edited by H. Read, M. Fordham, and G. Adler. The series Executive Editor is W. McGuire. R. F. C. Hull is the translator for all cited material unless otherwise noted. The volumes consulted were published by Princeton University Press in Princeton, NJ unless otherwise noted.

To write this chapter in the story of where typology can lead is to pay homage to a father. I went into analysis with a father complex and was lucky enough to find a psychological father in my third analyst, Joseph Henderson, who was himself analyzed by Jung. To work with Jung, Henderson had sailed for Europe in 1929 just before the stock market crashed—fortunate timing because his family’s money was to disappear soon after. Henderson was able to get a year of analysis with Jung. He then studied medicine—at Jung’s recommendation—in England, where he married Helena Cornford, a great granddaughter of Charles Darwin. With their young daughter, the couple later came to New York; Henderson began a practice of Jungian analysis, counting among his analysands the then unknown artist Jackson Pollock. A bit later the family relocated to the San Francisco Bay Area. Joining with Joseph Wheelwright and several others, Henderson helped to form and guide the first Jungian training group in the world, now known as the C. G. Jung Institute of San Francisco, where I took my own training starting in 1970. By the time I met him, Dr. Henderson was quite evidently a man used to living and adapting to many different cultures, and he brought a kind of psychological urbanity to the exploration of individual complexes, including the type complexes that I have been sketching in this book.

Cultural attitudes

In his book, *Cultural Attitudes in Psychological Perspective*, published after two decades of work in 1984, Henderson identified four contrasting stances that he saw as traditional orientations to culture, describing them as attitudes that explain much about how different individuals choose to engage with the culture in which they live. In this context, ‘culture’ can be thought of as the expressions and products of the shared, rarely examined assumptions and values of a group of people. These four stances that Henderson defined were the social, the religious, the aesthetic, and the philosophic.
In that book, Henderson says that the social attitude is concerned with “maintaining the ethical code of the culture” (1984, p. 17), but his meaning turns out more precisely to be that the social attitude sustains a culture’s ethos—everything from its political principles to its social fabric. The social attitude seeks to keep the uniting spirit of a culture alive, and therefore attends to the ways people in that culture come together to enact its spirit, whether at play or at work. He cites Virginia Woolf’s character Mrs. Dalloway as an example of a person with a developed social attitude, because she is conscious of trying subtly to influence others in ways that will benefit their belonging in English culture and at the same time allow them to be themselves in it (pp. 20–21).

Distinguishing the religious attitude, Henderson says that it can “appear only when the rewards and comforts of a parent–child relationship, or dependence upon testimonials of other people’s faith, have been outgrown” so that there can be “an awakening [of] consciousness to that principle of Self to which the ego willingly submits.” Henderson notes that this “initial submission of the ego to a superordinate power” is characterized by T. S. Eliot (in The Waste Land) as “that moment of surrender that a lifetime of prudence can never retract.” A hallmark of the religious attitude is “the immediate conviction that spirit permeates all life” (p. 27).

The religious attitude need not be associated with organized religion. Henderson shrewdly cautions that the religious attitude may be impersonated or commandeered by the social attitude, because of the latter’s readiness to intrude into the public beliefs and practices of others.

The aesthetic attitude is grounded in the individual experience of beauty and the often exuberant conviction that emerges from such an experience that the beauty one has glimpsed is united to the perception of something beyond it that is so true that it opens up infinite possibilities for one’s own life. This is the stance that, as Henderson remarks, informs the controversial exclamation, only apparently philosophic, of the great English Romantic poet Keats while contemplating, in his “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” the train of thought that can be experienced when studying an ancient Greek vase: “Beauty is truth; truth beauty—that is all/ Ye know on earth and all ye need to know.” Henderson writes that, unlike the social and religious attitudes, the aesthetic attitude exists “without any sense of duty whatsoever” (p. 45).

The philosophic attitude, by contrast to the aesthetic, is cooler, more thoroughly checked-out. As Henderson puts it, “When I meet the philosophic attitude, either in patients or in friends, I am impressed by their scrupulosity in getting to the truth of things” (p. 59). The philosophic attitude needs not only to know, but also to weigh what it knows. It is building a system of understandings that it must test before they can be trusted to offer support as a bridge to knowledge. Henderson therefore saw the philosophic attitude as a prerequisite to the rigors of a scientific method (p. 77).

**Recognizing the cultural attitudes**

One way to recognize these four attitudes, which Henderson believes are amply represented by people in any culture, is to notice how differently people choose
to spend their optional cultural time. One can start by asking oneself, “How did I spend my weekend?” Did I party or volunteer for a collective social cause or participate in watching or playing a team sport? Did I go to church to commune in my own favorite way with God, or to a yoga class, or to a meditation retreat? Did I go out of my way, perhaps in lieu of social interaction, to see an art show at a museum or a film by a director whose approach to filmmaking I have been following and want to savor or share? Did I go and give attentive concentration to a thoughtful lecture or spend hours reading a work of nonfiction that lays out a new idea to clarify the basis of an unsolved cultural problem?

Sources and antecedents of Henderson’s theory

Henderson (1984, p. 10) identifies William James as a principal inspiration of the theory of cultural attitudes, citing James’s *Pragmatism*:

Against rationalism as a pretension and a method, pragmatism is fully armed and militant. But, at the outset, at least, it stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method. As the young Italian pragmatist Papini has well said, it lies in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it. In one you may find a man writing an aesthetic volume; in the next someone on his knees praying for faith and strength; in a third a chemist investigating a body’s properties. In a fourth a system of idealistic metaphysics is being excogitated; in a fifth the impossibility of metaphysics is being shown. But they all own the corridor, and all must pass through it if they want a practicable way of getting into or out of their respective rooms.

*James, 1907/2008, p. 30*

As Samuel Kimbles (2003) has clarified, Henderson’s conception of the cultural attitudes germinated in 1929–1930. Kimbles cites these lines from a paper by Henderson:

When I was in Zurich as an analysand of Doctor Jung, I noticed in other analysands . . . a certain kind of transference commonly made upon Jung himself or upon his method, consisting in a certain cultural preference or bias which caused us to find in the analytical situation the same cultural disposition we preferred from our inherent background derived from education in the broadest sense of the term . . . In accordance with the cultural preference . . . one person found Jung’s analysis acceptable because he was so religious, another because he was so scientific, another because he was philosophical.

*Henderson, 1964, cited in Kimbles, 2003, p. 53*

In the same paper, Henderson recalls that the idea of the four cultural attitudes came up in a conversation in the 1930s with Friedrich Spiegelberg, a professor of philosophy and religion who had participated at the Eranos conferences, and again in
Henderson’s reading of the book, *Four Ways of Philosophy*, by Irwin Edman (1937). Recognizing the degree to which the complexities of our contemporary multicultural civilization preclude these attitudes emerging very often in their purest cultural forms, or even being present at once in a fully integrated way (as we sometimes imagine them to have been in the archaic cultures we idealize), Henderson at a later point in his long engagement with the idea, was able to say: “The original integrity of these cultural modes of expression is lost in any large civilization, but they emerge as individual modes handed down from one group of individuals to others through culture-contact and the creation of historical records” (1977, p. 126).

Jung’s own strong interest in the history and world-views of religious culture (Jung, 1969) is another wellspring of Henderson’s work on cultural attitudes. Henderson was to conclude that a psychological perspective emerges in analysis that affects the way traditional cultural attitudes are appropriated and used (for instance by taking from traditional religions mainly what is psychologically relevant to the person, rather than accepting entire a particular dogma just to be able to express authentically a newfound religious attitude (Henderson, 1982, pp. 127–138)). This conception of the psychological perspective or attitude made all the difference in how the new science of analytical psychology was received and taught at the Jung Institute of San Francisco. There, complex theory, as a key to approaching the unconscious, and Jungian typology, as a theory of conscious mind, were emphasized equally as a basis for an analytical practice that, however deep it went, would be solidly grounded in a grasp of the subjective individual psyche making the journey. Securing the personhood of a ‘little-s’ self was thought to be essential before an analysand could be encouraged, within therapy, to consider the contributions archetypes might make to that self’s realization of the perspective of a more objective, transpersonal Self.

Thus Henderson knew he was approaching the traditional attitudes with which educated, adult persons had always related to their cultures through the lens of the pragmatic relation to psychological experience pioneered by William James and applied to psychoanalysis by Jung with a sense of the pluralism of approaches that individual differences, such as typological differences, demanded. Henderson’s approach to culture had a democratic slant from the start that was quintessentially American as well as Jungian. For instance a supporting antecedent was American cultural anthropology as taught in relation to the psychology of personality by Harvard professors Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry Murray, in their seminal textbook, *Personality in Nature, Society and Culture* (1948). This book became basic to Henderson’s recognition of the need to factor culture into any analysis of personality (Henderson, 1985, personal communication).

Henderson’s formulation of the cultural attitudes is a Jungian parallel to the work of an earlier student of Murray’s, Erik Erikson, whose integrative psychoanalytic text, *Childhood and Society* (1950), offers cultural and developmental perspectives seamlessly woven together. Henderson’s work, however, adds the idea of different attitudes toward culture itself as a way of guiding individual consciousness through its assimilation of what culture has to offer and tries to exact from each of us.
More than any other analyst of his generation, Henderson emphasized the presence of real individual choice in this matter, based on the attitude toward culture that is natural to the given person.

**The relationship of cultural attitude to psychological type**

It doesn’t take very long, if one stops to look, to recognize the degree to which different people presenting themselves for analysis manifest different cultural attitudes. As a psychological theorist, Henderson did not bother himself with how these attitudes were formed, since, for him, in an extraverted sensation way that he liked to let rule him (extraverted sensation being the language of his anima), these characteristic attitudes just *were*. They were the basis of how patients use analysis. He did, however, conclude that the people he was working with manifested different cultural attitudes in a conscious manner that seemed to him separate from their psychological type. He writes, for instance, taking Jung’s own conclusions on the matter as his authority:

> It sometimes seems that Jung’s four typological functions, taken separately, subtend the cultural attitudes. In *Psychological Types*, he speaks of two kinds of intuition in an introvert: that which tends toward an aesthetic attitude, and that which inclines one toward a philosophic attitude (Jung, *Cw 6*, ¶¶661–662). In other places, Jung seems to regard aestheticism as the product of the two ‘perceptive’ functions, intuition and sensation, while the philosophic or social attitudes become identified with the two ‘rational’ functions, thinking and feeling.

*1984, p. 75*

Henderson continues:

> In his later work, however, Jung disclaims any identity between cultural attitudes and psychological function. . . . No matter how faithfully we develop the four functions or understand them in other people, they do not account for the existence of religious, philosophic, aesthetic or social values. Hence there is a remarkable difference between people of identical personality type and function if they are differently oriented to culture.

*pp. 75–76*

**Cultural attitudes analyzed typologically**

I agree with Henderson that there is not a direct correspondence between a person’s psychological type and his or her relation to the cultural attitudes, but I believe that the eight-function, eight-archetype model will allow us, nevertheless, to learn much more about the formation of cultural attitudes based on what we have discovered about type development and type dynamics.
From its name alone, we might guess that the social attitude involves the extraverted feeling function, since extraverted feeling is concerned with mutual trust and the harmonious working of groups. However, anyone who has ever tried to keep a group united and operating according to a given ethos by relying on extraverted feeling alone will have learned that a culture cannot be sustained in that way for very long. It turns out that a shared rhetoric is needed: foundational principles of the culture must be articulated so simply and clearly that they seem to be ‘self-evident’ and beyond question. Rules or laws are also needed and must be applied consistently, regardless of the individual personalities involved. In short, extraverted feeling must be combined with extraverted thinking to make a social attitude that is effective. Thus, for example, in politics, extraverted feeling may impel us to want to address a particular social problem, but we will soon turn to extraverted thinking to plan and organize a solution. Similarly, a military officer deploying troops according to an extraverted thinking plan of attack will have to stretch into extraverted feeling to insure that the plan does not falter because the morale of the troops and their social cohesion have been overlooked. The power and flexibility of any effective social attitude lies in the combination and balance of these two extraverted, rational functions.

The religious attitude is one that I associate with introverted intuition because this attitude privileges and trusts one’s own perceptions of what is real, fundamental, and of lasting importance over what others may see and think. When introverted intuition is operating well, an image of the deeper reality compellingly presents itself. But I would argue that something more than introverted intuition, with its ability to move beyond uncanny knowing to a convincing divining, is needed to turn the predilection to notice the religious dimension of life into an effective cultural attitude. This something more is introverted sensation with its instinct for specificity and its attention to what is and can be factually verified rather than just to a mystery that has been glimpsed through a transient epiphany. For example, Henderson cites the work of the alchemists, bearing witness to the changes of color and form during the long process of cooking the primal matter that is being chemically transformed, as an exercise of the religious attitude (1984, pp. 31–33). Anyone who has studied the allegorical images the alchemists made as analogies for processes they observed will notice the degree of illumination they are able to bring to the workings of nature within their alembics. I would say that it was the combination of introverted intuition, with its unbounded, symbolic literacy, and introverted sensation, with its observant clarity, that imbued the study of alchemical transformation with religious vision.

In a paper on dream interpretation (1972), Henderson described the combination of these two functions in getting to the meaning of a dream:

Introverted intuition perceives the variety and the possibility for development of the inner images, whereas introverted sensation perceives the specific image which defines the psychic activity that needs immediate attention.
If now we apply this kind of functioning to the perception of a dream, we meet both of these functions in a state of collision. . . . The intuitive function sees many things the dream might mean and is highly productive in summoning forth a wide variety of free associations, especially of the kind Jung has called amplifications. . . . But no amount of amplifications can give the true meaning of a dream. This must come from introverted sensation which can single out from all the possible meanings that one meaning which tells us what is the specific psychic activity behind the dream and how it can be brought into the foreground of consciousness.

Although Henderson does not use the word ‘religious’ to describe how he sees this process, I would say, having been his patient, that that is what it was for him. I recall, for instance, his reading some typed dreams I had left behind in a session in which I had not left us enough time to get to them. He told me at the start of our next session, “There was a baby born in those dreams you left behind last time.” This signified a rebirth of my attitude toward the work we were engaged in in analytic practice (Beebe, 1984). By helping me draw together introverted intuition and introverted sensation, when I was in danger of neither accounting for all my inner material nor divining its significance, he managed to illuminate the value of both functions for me, and sparked an insight that was almost magical in its effect, going far beyond what either function could have done on its own, even if I had been able to command it. Studying the dream, which involved a baby whose foot had a distinctive outline being presented to Jung on his deathbed, as if a new addition to the family, I realized that I had identified my own Jungian standpoint. But to get to this insight required not just Henderson, with his reliable, dominant introverted intuition to guide me to this dream, but Jane Wheelwright, my control analyst supervising my cases at the time, to clarify with the specificity and groundedness of her introverted sensation that the baby’s foot was really a standpoint, the very one I needed to finish Jungian training and be my own man. It was that real to her. So this insight, which has informed all my subsequent work, took two actual analysts, both of whom knew how to link introverted intuition and introverted sensation, coming from the opposite sides of this balance in their own personal typologies, but each supporting in a living way the Jungian attitude that was still undeveloped in me, so that their different type perspectives could come together with enough punch to make me realize that this special child was in fact my own way to carry forward the religious care that in his life Jung had brought to the inspection and analysis of psyche.

The beauty of this insight was not lost on my already better-developed aesthetic attitude, which even before I came to analysis was a place where opposite functions could come together and center me. In medical school at the University of Chicago, I often found the energy to sustain my morale against the extraverted sensation demands of the training that as an extraverted intuitive I was ill-equipped to meet, by going to the Chicago Art Institute, which inevitably connected me to extraverted sensation through beauty in a totally satisfying way. To experience life
with an *aesthetic attitude* must surely involve extraverted sensation, since we know that that function is concerned with getting stimulation and enjoyment from sensory experience. Extraverted sensation on its own, however, might lead merely to thrill-seeking or hedonism, were it not combined with something else. Such an other thing, I would propose, is what I brought to looking at art, *extraverted intuition*, which spots the still unrealized possibilities in things, including the things on display at a museum.

A splendidly realized depiction of the aesthetic attitude in action can be found in Jacques Tati’s film, *Mr. Hulot’s Holiday* (*Les Vacances de M. Hulot*, 1953). On the last night of his vacation, the hero, a likeable, bumbling, extraverted intuitive lights a match in a dark shed that turns out to be a storehouse for fireworks. The pandemonium that ensues is some of the most thrilling, exquisitely choreographed chaos one could ever hope to experience. Tati’s spectacular scene is an example of what Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s biographer Richard Holmes presents in his book, *Darker Reflections* (1998), as Coleridge’s conception of beauty: “Beauty as an explosion of energy, perfectly contained.”

Expertly portrayed by Tati himself, with his demonic extraverted sensation on full display, Mr. Hulot imagines at first that he will be able to gain control over the fireworks. He attempts to extinguish them by opening a nearby hose bib, but the hose is firmly attached to the spigot. The hose’s other end is coupled to a rotary sprinkler, which our hero chases in a circle as it spins. The bursting fireworks light up the sky around the hotel where other vacationers are staying and even fly in through an open window. Everyone is awakened; the energy soon ignites their enthusiasm. A Victrola is inadvertently started up and begins playing loud jazz, at which point, we experience, in common with the vacationers, a cultural form that actually can contain the energy Hulot has brought to their on-holiday boredom. The entire community is somehow able to join in creating a cultural attitude that is receptive to this eruption. This is the aesthetic attitude.

Tati cuts back to Mr. Hulot, who now carries, without harm, a linked pair of Catherine Wheel fireworks as they twirl. They are like two sparkling centers of consciousness, but also like a bicycle, a new vehicle for him. We recognize Mr. Hulot, the persona employed by Jacques Tati, as a character who has become an artist, lit up by the possibility of being conscious of his effects. At that point, we can say that the director’s aesthetic attitude has been completely constructed. Indeed, it was with this film that Jacques Tati became recognized as a cinema auteur.

The reader will appreciate that I have used typology as a kind of critical theory to explain an aesthetic effect. In doing so, I have ventured into my own other most differentiated cultural attitude, the *philosophic*. In the effort to construe philosophically, as a critic of culture must do, both thinking and feeling participate, and both are used with near ruthlessness in an introverted way, as I have used my thinking and feeling here, to get at core meanings that are mined not just as understandings in themselves but as valuable benchmarks against which to measure all future thought-discovers in the realm of culture. The way I saw this scene in Tati’s film has been a key to other movies as well, and to my own philosophy of film art.
And here, Coleridge, one of the greatest and most psychological of philosophers of art, anticipates my argument just as surely as he anticipated Tati’s effect, writing in 1814, about the effect of “the sportive wildness of the component figures” in Raphael’s fresco Galatea which he had viewed with his painter friend Washington Allston. As biographer Richard Holmes recounts, “together they had discovered Raphael’s principle of harmony, a monumental circular structure within the central group (the old coach wheel), geometrically controlled by a ‘multiplicity of rays and cords.’”

But

Coleridge used a striking scientific analogy to sum up the harmonious beauty of Raphael’s composition, in one of his most original pieces of art criticism. He praised the “balance, the perfect reconciliation, effected between these two conflicting principles of the FREE LIFE, and of the confining FORM! How entirely is the stiffness that would have resulted from the obvious regularity of the latter, fused and (if I may hazard so bold a metaphor) almost volatilized by the interpretation and electrical flashes of the former.”


Thus Holmes tells us,

The chemical image was recalled from Davy’s method of isolating primary elements with charges from a voltaic battery. It emphasized the dynamic, almost explosive, concept that Coleridge had of Beauty; or rather Beauty as an explosion of energy perfectly contained.

This gets at the alchemical quality of the energy-releasing union of the opposed principle of free life—extraverted intuition, with its sense of endless possibility—and the principle of realism—extraverted sensation, with its limiting focus on the actual forms of things. Coleridge’s wheel and electrical flashes fully anticipate what Tati would realize on the screen as improbably joined opposites of containment and energy, which for him too is the essence, and the deeply comedic capacity, of the aesthetic attitude to release from the shock of the unexpected a congenial joy.

There is a similar pleasure in introverted thinking and introverted feeling combining to produce the happy thought that this is what makes it possible for us to appreciate art so much. That pleasure inheres in the philosophic attitude that permits criticism that is as acutely understanding as Coleridge’s to be perennially relevant to actual poetic practice.

Rilke’s famous sonnet, “Torso of an Archaic Apollo,” rescued by William H. Gass (2000) from nearly a century of translations that led away from the dynamics of the poem itself, is a paean to the god’s power to evoke the philosophic attitude. The premise of the poem is that all that is left of an original image of Apollo, sculpted in the archaic period of Ancient Greece, is its torso, but what we can now see implies everything we can no longer see. The poet conjures the statue’s head
with its eyes like the dual globes of the gas streetlamps that illuminated the night at the time of the poem’s publication. The poet tells us of this old, yet new Apollo, “Yet his torso glows as if his look were set above it . . . Otherwise the surging breast would not thus blind you . . . there’s no place that does not see you. You must change your life” (Rilke in Gass, 2000, pp. 92–93).

It is not simply the god’s ability to see through us with his penetrating gift of introverted thinking, defining all of what we are; it is our ability to feel the rightness of his insight that gives his gaze its transforming power. This is the trajectory that emerges in the construction of the philosophic attitude—the force of our values moving us to see the way thought develops. The architectural layout of this old Greek statue of Apollo was planned, with extraverted thinking, as carefully as an Austro-Hungarian empire streetlamp. The architecture allowed the eyes of the god, if we follow Rilke’s phantomatic summoning of them, a piercing insight into the nature of the thing observed. This is philosophy’s relevant subtlety personified, for the thing so fully perceived is some habit of thought within ourselves. And once philosophy has seen through what is fictional in our soul’s very logic, we cannot but agree to transform the life it has led us to live. Such is the consequence of the Apollonian gaze of philosophy, which also oriented Freud, Rilke’s Nietzsche-informed analyst. The philosophic attitude, when adopted by an introverted feeling type such as Freud (Jung, 1975, pp. 346–348 and 349–350), forces reflections on the truth of what we are. It is driven by a truly daimonic introverted thinking that undermines all our fictions. Then introverted feeling has to bow to that rush of insight. As Alfred Adler realized for individual psychology, when reflective thought can makes us feel how much our illusions have led us astray, we have to cease to live by them.

The stretch

Not everyone, in my experience, develops a cultural attitude, but when one is present, it offers an enormous advantage to the person possessing it. Consulting in close proximity two functions that normally do not cooperate, such as introverted feeling with introverted thinking, or extraverted intuition with extraverted sensation, is a bit like harnessing to the same wagon two very independent, rather headstrong horses that, in the past, have not particularly trusted each other. Perhaps they can pull together, but it doesn’t happen without effort and missteps!

To engage a consciousness that is more comfortable and familiar to us with one that feels quite Other—especially in a combination that we usually experience as an ‘either/or’ rather than a ‘both/and’—is a daunting innovation for the psyche. But once we are able to make that stretch, to be truly respectful and attentive to the kind of consciousness that feels so foreign, it seems that we also become more open to other non-preferred types of consciousness too. This budding openness to the other types of awareness is entirely applicable in interacting with culture because all eight types of consciousness are bound to be expressed, in some way, in a culture, some more openly than others. To have a cultural attitude, therefore, is to be prepared to engage effectively with what is Other to the self we know.
The formation of cultural attitudes

The need to relate to otherness has become the requisite skill for living in the twenty-first century. Henderson’s four traditional cultural attitudes, which make sense within just about any culture, are very suitable for managing self–Other interactions. For this reason, individuating people starting with an agenda of defining personal identity often end up stretching that identity to achieve, for the first time as their own, one or more of these four cultural attitudes.

We can see the stretch symbolized in *The Wizard of Oz* (see Chapter 5) as extraverted-feeling Dorothy finally manages to enlist the extraverted-thinking Wizard to join with her to help her Oz friends. As I have argued in the previous chapter, this unexpected cooperation could hardly have happened had Dorothy not had the friendship of the Scarecrow and the help of her other companions, Toto, the Tin Woodman, and the Cowardly Lion. But it was particularly the Scarecrow, self-proclaimed as a case of inferior thinking, whose introverted thinking could label the Wizard a “humbug” when Dorothy could only tell the Wizard that he was “a very bad man.” Together, Dorothy and the Scarecrow defined at that moment an axis of integrity that enabled them to stand up to the demonic Wizard, who had been doing everything possible to undermine them, and redirect him to use his extraverted thinking in a helpful way.

This formula can be applied to any eighth function, which is in the archetypal position of being characteristically undermining, unless it is held to a standard of integrity, in which case it can become daimonic, an opportunity for spirit to enter the psyche from a shadowy place that had once only been an occasion for fear. We could say that prayer has the same effect with regard to a deity; the integrity that accompanies the humility of praying to a power Other enough to be potentially destructive, and which may in its own way have already visited destruction on some aspect of the life of the person now praying, often moves the very same deity enough to offer illumination, compassion, and a transformative intervention. We see this in the Wizard of Oz in a more secular way when he uses his extraverted thinking like a therapist, to reframe and transform through the magic of collectively sanctioned words what has been low self-esteem about thinking, feeling and courage into an internalized authorization for the Scarecrow to go on thinking, the Tin Woodman to use his introverted feeling, and the Cowardly Lion to realize the courage that has always been his. But it is Dorothy’s ability to appreciate the Wizard’s effort, as we viewers do, seeing the changing situation from Dorothy’s viewpoint, that convinces us that a new attitude has been born within the film as a whole, and within Dorothy as its leading character. Her extraverted feeling affirmation of the Wizard’s self-redemption through the healing use of extraverted thinking is the stretch that Dorothy—and we in the audience—have to make. We are glad to make it because of the cultural attitude that results. Rightly, the citizens of the Emerald City gather soon after to see this pair on to further adventures in America!

Yet the eighth function remains an Other that cannot totally be trusted: the Wizard does not know how to control the inflation of the balloon that results, and he ends up going off without Dorothy when she has to attend, briefly, to her tricky little dog. And we can say, more than three-quarters of a century after
this movie was released, that America too has not been able to sustain the cultural attitude that the Roosevelt years, with their extraverted feeling, promised to the country that historically had emphasized and trusted extraverted thinking. America’s imperial strategizing has often exceeded its compassionate good will, and so the democratic social attitude has had only varying success on the world stage. But it remains the cultural attitude that is most truly compatible with American individuation, and we long for it still, more than just the integrity of an extraverted thinking country in touch with good introverted feeling values. The return to these, by Dorothy, at home at last with Aunty Em, is a psychological achievement, but not quite the same thing as a fully realized and sustained cultural attitude.

Without such a stretch into what is normally seen as beyond the self, the personality, however capable it is of managing its own life, may be dangerously uncomprehending of the life experience of other people—especially of people who are not ‘type-compatible.’ A person stuck in a dominant function and unable to see why a stretch beyond it might be worth attempting is often perceived as rigid. Some amelioration of this overreliance on the dominant function comes normally after midlife, when a connection is made to the anima or animus that carries the inferior function. This is a shock at first, but it promises the potential for renewal.

Elsewhere in this book (Chapter 11), I argue that Salome, whom Jung met in the active imaginations he recorded in the Red Book, and who presented herself as the soul he was searching for, embodies extraverted sensation, an opposite to Jung’s more native introverted intuition. As she intercedes in his psychic life, they end up defining together an irrational standpoint. After his encounter with her, we see that Jung is much more ready to transcend the rigidity of his original dominant function. At this point, Jung becomes Jung, and that means that he has achieved a ‘little-s’ selfhood that will enable him not only to imagine, know, and divine but also encounter, experience, and enjoy the many parts of his psyche. Now he is in a position to stretch into the psyche in new ways.

For instance, the demonic function of his psyche is not necessarily just undermining or threatening, and he has the humility to let it become a daimon. Witnessing the demonic function become a tutelary figure, as it can in long-term psychotherapy, a typologically minded observer can see that when the dominant and daimonic functions start to span the enormous differences between them, self and other come together to create a cultural attitude big enough to allow the self to live in the world. We see this play out in the Red Book after Jung has accepted the invasion of the ghost Anabaptists into his home as a reality he has to deal with (Jung, 1963, pp. 189–191) and applies himself to the strangely specific and concrete concerns that the spirits express (Shamdasani & Beebe, 2010, pp. 426–427). To harness spiritual introverted intuition in service to embodied introverted sensation is to form a religious attitude (Beebe, 2014, p. 117; see also Chapters 11, pp. 175–178, and 12, pp. 186–187, of the present book). Jung’s articulate alter-ego Philemon expresses this attitude clearly throughout the Seven Sermons to the Dead,
which is in effect a first draft of Jung’s later analytical psychology, with its distinctive take on psyche itself as a discovery of the sacred living in us in astonishingly specific ways (Jung, 2009, pp. 346–354, including notes).

A different stretch between functions that do not ordinarily cooperate is that between the auxiliary, parental function and the trickster. In The Wizard of Oz, this pairing is between Glinda the Good, depicted as a motherly introverted intuitive, and Toto, the trickster, whose type seems to be introverted sensation. Between them they oversee Dorothy’s spiritual development, helping her to rely on her own consciousness of a duty to her loved ones, the Christian attitude of sacrifice, and self-reliance in the service of what is good, despite the curves that loved ones throw.

This is not, however, the second most developed cultural attitude in The Wizard of Oz. That honor goes to the Witch in relation to the part of Dorothy that is not a budding adolescent heroine but still a little girl, cowering in fear at the heroic feats her individuation journey requires of her. The extraverted intuitive Witch’s ability to instill terror in the part of Dorothy that is locked into the present—the extraverted sensation puella, the female counterpart to the frightened little boy that is the Cowardly Lion—produces extreme aesthetic pleasure in anyone who watches the movie. The Witch acknowledges as much after Dorothy throws a bucket of water on her. As she melts away, she cries, “Oh, what a world! What a world! Who would have thought a good little girl like you could destroy my beautiful wickedness!” (Langley, Ryerson, & Woolf, 1989, p. 119). This sounds like the aesthete’s lament for the fact that artistically beautiful forms, for all the wicked skill with which they are contrived, cannot finally survive a world that has other, more urgent priorities.

A number of the principal actors in The Wizard of Oz play dual roles—portraying one character in Kansas and another in Oz—but, in depicting the frightened, impulsive child so distinctly from the heroine, Judy Garland makes it possible in her scenes in the witch’s castle for the film to let us feel the stretch between extraverted intuition and extraverted sensation that creates the movie’s aesthetic attitude. These scenes recall cliffhanger suspense movies such as The Perils of Pauline (1914); they also help us to appreciate all the other vaudeville entertainments with which the film is filled.

The cultural attitude that is not well developed in the film is the philosophic attitude. Dorothy’s efforts to explain what she has learned (“If I ever go looking for my heart’s desire, I won’t look any further than my own backyard, because if it isn’t there I never really lost it to begin with”) seem strained and muddled, both as logic and as value, as does her homily, “There’s no place like home.” The introverted thinking really seems as inferior as the thinking the Scarecrow complained of, perhaps unfairly, in himself. We can see that, without any depicted interaction suggesting a genuine connection with introverted feeling as might have been demonstrated by a genuine friendship between the Scarecrow and the Tin Woodman, who embodies oppositional introverted feeling in Oz, it’s not surprising that Dorothy’s attempt at philosophy rests shakily on thin ground.
It is rare in most films for the anima or animus figure to connect to the figure representing the opposing personality, yet it is only when that happens that a hero or heroine is truly challenged by a different cultural attitude than he or she would normally use. Something like this does happen in the movie Broadcast News (1987) when the overconfident heroine, a producer of TV news from Washington, D.C., played by Holly Hunter as an extraverted thinking type, is confronted by a duel between two reporters over the philosophy of how the news is told. One reporter is a smart, critical, introverted thinking type, the film’s opposing personality, this heroine’s best male friend. The other is a seductively handsome introverted feeling type who is her current love object. This somewhat vulnerable introverted feeler is not above falsifying the reporting of a story to enhance its emotional effect. Like Jung trying to reconcile two types of truth, the heroine and the audience are torn by the ethical question of which of the two has the greater integrity. In Broadcast News, the philosophic attitude reveals a deep split in the American character. None of the characters is able to establish a relationship with each other in which anyone feels ‘at home.’

The Wizard of Oz and Broadcast News offer the promise and the shadow of the evolution of American culture, showing how much a nation individuates through the generation of effective cultural attitudes. One of the pleasures of American cinema is the degree to which cultural attitudes are constructed in them, which enable us to reflect on America herself.

How much can we expect individuals, as opposed to nations, to construct cultural attitudes? Some individuals seem to function adequately without any cultural attitude, in part by steering clear of engaging too deeply with culture. For example, they may focus more on their immediate family, hobbies, and work and avoid getting into political, religious, philosophical, or aesthetic discussions and concerns.

Other people find fault with the dominant cultural attitude that surrounds them and, rebelling, seek a different attitude to live by. Such people generally develop for themselves a new cultural attitude out of the traditional four that Henderson described, and for a time rather insist upon it. In time they will often discover from the reactions of others that this new cultural attitude, formed out of combinations such as extraverted feeling and extraverted thinking, or introverted intuition and introverted sensation, being exclusively extraverted or introverted, and also exclusively rational or irrational, is insufficient. For this reason, many people find that they need to develop a second cultural attitude to balance the one-sidedness of their first.

Something like this happened with me, when I found my first self-achieved cultural attitude, which was aesthetic, was not enough to carry me through life. I had become an intense irrational, extraverted, aesthetic snob. I could sense that I needed a more prudent, rational, and reflective attitude as well—though not yet articulating the limitation of the aesthetic attitude in those psychological terms! By instinct, I stumbled toward the development of a philosophic attitude. The Harvard English major became the medical student studying science to qualify for psychiatry where I would take up a psychological theory. Yet I have chosen, often
The formation of cultural attitudes

enough, to ground that theory in the aesthetic elaborations of culture, finding that rational, introverted theory comes alive when applied to the irrational extraverted exuberance of art. Less easy for me to come by is a stable relationship to either the social or the religious attitude. But what I have of these has given me a way into the world that I am grateful for, and that completes my typology, always a source of development of self, as something that can extend itself to relate to the consciousness of others.

A psychological attitude

At a presentation in San Francisco in 1991, Henderson said:

After having written several papers about cultural attitudes some years ago, I realized that I had been observing them from another point of view entirely. I would not have thought of making this classification (of religious, social, aesthetic and philosophic attitudes), if I had not been a psychologist. This made me realize that there is another attitude, not just mine, which is also acquiring widespread attention in our time that can only be described as ‘psychological.’ So I decided to add another cultural attitude to my list, a Psychological Attitude.

Henderson in Benveniste, 2000, p. 44

Elsewhere he has remarked that “psychology, in a Jungian sense, if properly valued, lays the foundation for a psychological attitude which has an identity of its own, while in no way challenging the other cultural attitudes or falsifying them” (Henderson, 1977, p. 142).

We can understand the psychological attitude as a stance taken toward psyche itself that can blossom once the presence of a self that knows what is good for itself begins to be palpable. This self, spelled with a ‘little-s’ to recognize its intermediate position between ego and Self (Beebe, 1979, 1981, 1988), is formed when the eight functions come together to create their alembic, providing a personal container to hold the self experience that is born of the relations between the functions. The Jungian analyst Charles Klaif (personal communication, 1986) once called this integrative area “the person in the psyche.” In Being a Character: Psychoanalysis and Self Experience, Christopher Bollas (1993, pp. 64–99) describes the agency that is released at such times as “psychic genera,” places of creative incubation that, in contrast to the traumas that sunder the spirit (Symington, 2002, pp. 131–140), bring new links to the mind and thus create the morale that is needed for healing and further individuation. Our typology, then, can be seen as a reservoir of consciousness that works within changing conditions of culture, capable of generating the cultural attitudes to do so. The psychological attitude provides flexibility for this system to stretch between its parts to generate cultural attitudes as needed to enhance self’s basic function, which is to maintain an adaptation to inner and outer reality.
Notes

1 We are referred, here, by Henderson to Chapter 10 of Jung’s *Psychological Types* to explore this understanding of sensation and intuition as perceptive functions, perception being regarded by Jung as an essentially “irrational” process and thinking and feeling as “rational” functions because their process, even when accompanied by emotion, involves reason, reflection, and the application of objective values (Jung, 1921/1971, ¶¶785–787).

2 I am indebted to John O’Donohue (2005) for introducing me to this way of putting how the experience of beauty, which is so core to the aesthetic attitude, is constructed.

References

Mr. Hulot's holiday (Les vacances de M. Hulot). (1953). Tati, J. (Director) France: Discifilm [Motion picture.]